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Introduction
Twenty years after the collapse of the Soviet system, there is growing interest in the longlasting e¤ects Communism had and still has on economically relevant notions. policy preferences such as attitudes towards income redistribution or pro-state provision of services that could as well be provided by private forces (e.g., Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln 2007) . In a recent paper, Rainer and Siedler (2009) examine whether the post-reuni…cation, democratic experience of East Germans enhances trust which has been shown to impact on a variety of economic outcomes (Knack and Keefer 1997, Alesina and La Ferrara 2002, Slemrod and Katuscak 2005) . Their …ndings suggest that some ten years after reuni…cation, East Germans still have the same levels of social distrust as shortly after the fall of the wall. An even more fundamental notion, as it can be seen as prerequisite for trust and altruistic cooperation, is fairness. At the individual level, it has for example been shown that sel…sh or greedy intentions destroy altruistic cooperation almost completely, whereas sanctions perceived as fair leave altruism intact (Fehr and Rockenbach 2003) . By now, there however are only a few studies that empirically study fairness at the societal level (see, e.g., Zak and Fakhar 2005) . To our knowledge, none of them analyzes the notion of fairness in the context of the German reuni…cation process.
We add to this literature (i) by re-examining the East-West trust gradient, (ii) by analyzing the e¤ects on individuals' risk attitudes and their persistence as well as (iii) by studying the di¤erences in the perception of others being fair and helpful and their persistence over time. Our hypotheses are derived from a model of German reuni…cation that incorporates individual responses both to incentives and to values inherited from earlier generations as recently suggested by Tabellini (2008b) . In contrast to Rainer and Siedler (2009) , who use repeated cross-sectional data, but similar to Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007), we use data from the German Socio-Economic Panel, which allows accounting for intra-personal correlation over time.
Our results indicate that despite almost twenty years of German reuni…cation, East Germans show a persistently lower level of social trust, which holds controlling for a wide range of socio-demographic and contextual characteristics as well as across various estimation approaches. They also continue to believe less that other people are fair or helpful. However, the patterns for these outcomes turn out to be somewhat less robust than our …ndings on trust. With regard to testing the model synthesizing incentives and inherited value systems, these results lend support to the passing of cultural traits across generations and for cooperation being sustained by values rather than by reputation. In line with recent evidence (see, e.g., Bonin et al. 2009 ), we also …nd East Germans to be more risk loving than their West German counterparts which again holds for an ample range of robustness checks. In contrast to trust and fairness, however, risk attitudes converge in the "two Germanies." In sum, while we …nd evidence for a persistent social distrust and scepticism in fairness of East Germans that notably is either not converging or converges very slowly to the West German level over the last decade, risk attitudes do converge. However, contrary to common belief the latter path of convergence is a trajectory from a relatively higher preference for risk among East Germans to the more risk averse attitude prevalent among West German individuals. We ascribe this …nding to path dependence as the evolution of a general notion of risk aversion at the societal level requires a democratic experience and system where public deliberation plays a crucial role in evaluating risk (Laidi 2010) .
Inspired by the …ndings of Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007) and particularly Rainer and Siedler (2008) that East Germans more likely favor state interventions, we run additional cross-sectional exercises and examine whether being raised under a highly rigid communist regime known as the German Democratic Republic (GDR) correlates 3 with respondents'attitudes towards progressive taxes but also with their external locus of control, i.e. individuals' beliefs that the actions of external forces are dominant for their lives' circumstances as well as with their propensity to reciprocate. The results from these exercises indicate that (i) East Germans, and particularly so East Germans who did not move west after reuni…cation, are more in favor of redistribution than their West German counterparts. (ii) Even 15 years after reuni…cation, East Germans have a higher external locus of control than their West German counterparts, which again, is more prevalent for those Easteners who did not relocate to former West Germany.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives an account of the historical background and summarizes the existing literature. In Section 3 the theoretical model is outlined. Central testable implications are derived. Empirical evidence is reported and discussed in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
Historical background and existing literature
In the aftermath of World War II, a population of 19.1 million lived in the Soviet zone that o¢ cially became the GDR in 1949. About one sixth of these individuals emigrated into the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) before the Berlin Wall was built in 1961. 2 About 20-30 percent of the current German population has been born and grew up in the GDR. These individuals experienced one of the most rigid regimes of the former communist block. East Germans were governed by a communist regime that severely and systematically violated the basic rights of its citizens over several decades. Given that the sparse freedom that people had was further undermined by the GDR's Ministry of State Security's (Ministerium für Staatssicherheit -MfS) secret service Staatssicherheit alias "Stasi," one could actually argue that it was the most rigid regime of the former communist block. Rainer and Siedler (2009, pp. 251-252) quantify the societal in…ltration and climate of mistrust in the following way referring to Koehler (1999) as central source for …gures: "The Stasi kept …les on an estimated six million people, and built up a network of civilian informants ('uno¢ cial collaborators'), who monitored politically incorrect behavior among other citizens. By 1995, 174,000 East Germans had been iden-ti…ed as uno¢ cial collaborators. This amounts to 2.5 percent of the total population and constitutes one of the highest penetrations of any society by a security apparatus.
In fact, the ratio of 'watchers'to 'watched'was even higher than (i.e. roughly 90-times) that of the Soviet Union under communism." Other sources document an even higher penetration of society with a total of 600,000 MfS collaborators, implying on average, at phone surveillance, and all sorts of observation and investigation disregarding any basic civic rights. The GDR system habitually imposed unfair moral choices: for example, denounce your neighbor or colleague, or your child will never go to university. It preached altruism but ingrained sel…shness. Obviously, in the words of Tabellini (2008b, p. 909) there is a history of political abuse and exploitation from which citizens of the former GDR su¤ered, possibly echoing to the present day. The central open question therefore is whether or by how much after two decades, i.e., after one generation having grown up in a free and law-governed society, restoration of public-spiritedness, decency, and trust is completed.
Before setting up our model of German reuni…cation, we will brie ‡y sketch some hypotheses in the existing literature as they relate to the relationship between political system and the notions of social trust, risk attitude, and fairness.
Political system and social trust
In a recent paper, Nunn and Watchekon (2010) document the high persistency of mistrust among black Africans whose ancestors were heavily raided during the slave trade. To capture a causal e¤ect the authors use historic proximity of ancestors to the coast of the Indian ocean and the Paci…c ocean to instrument slave trade intensity. They …nd that even 100 years after the end of the slave trade period, the system left its traces in terms of an eroded level of social trust. Of course, we would not expect such a secular persistency of mistrust in the aftermath of the GDR system given that the slave trade period lasted for about four centuries, depriving colored individuals from basically all human rights, while the repressive surveillance-based system of the GDR existed for four decades. Therefore, when it comes to comparing West and East German individuals, we 6 would rather expect similar or even more pronounced evidence of a gap in social trust as reported in Tabellini (2008a) who …nds that trust of second-generation U.S. citizens is higher if they came from countries that over a century ago had the better political institutions. Based on data from repeated cross-sections Rainer and Siedler (2009) …nd some …rst indications for this hypothesis to hold for the …rst decade after Germany's reuni…cation, that is, for the early transition period of East Germany from a communist regime to a market-based democracy. However, to measure the (inherited) persistency of mistrust and a potential convergence of trust levels in the post-transition period, the use of panel data is preferable to relying on cross-sectional data. In the context of passing values and attitudes over generations, of course, controlling for age will be crucial. Sutter and Kocher (2007), for example, …nd in an experimental trust game setting that trust and trustworthiness increase more or less linearly with age.
Political system and risk attitude
Similar to trust that is found to be -if at all-poorly explained by the self-interestapproach (Fehr and Rockenbach 2003) , risk aversion at the societal level is not a simple matter of rationality but rather a matter of identity. To make this point Laidi (2010) provocatively states that even North Korea weighs the costs and bene…ts of launching missile strikes on Japan. But what is it that makes a society risk averse (in a rather wide sense) going beyond the slogan of a country being a "soft power?" The answer given by Laidi (2010) is that the evolution of a general notion of risk aversion at the societal level requires a democratic experience and a system where public deliberation plays a crucial role in evaluating risk. In analogy to the First Amendment, freedom of opinion in the FRG is guaranteed in Article 5 of its Basic Law (Grundgesetz ), i.e., its post-war constitutional law that was formally approved on 8 May 1949, and, with the signature of the Western Allies, came into e¤ect on 23 May 1949, as the constitution of West Germany. Today the Grundgesetz represents the constitution of reuni…ed Germany. Article 5 comprises freedom of speech and freedom of press. It explicitly interdicts censorship.
In contrast, the GDR witnessed a constitution that successively eroded the freedom of opinion from its …rst version of 1949 to its proceeding versions of 1968 and 1974, which o¢ cially set the state in its Article I under the leadership of its one and only party, the Marxist-Leninist party (SED). It cleared the way for all sorts of uncritical propaganda.
While the Prague Spring period of political liberalization and the 1968 reform movement in Czechoslovakia did not show substantial contagious e¤ects in the GDR, FRG citizens at the same time witnessed a broad societal protest movement against perceived authoritarianism and hypocrisy of the German government and other Western governments. In the following decades and in particular with the birth of the West German Green Party (Die Grünen) in the early 1980s, e¤ectively extending the political arena to a four party competition, external concerns of the public like the threat through medium-range missiles or, in general, the arms race in the course of the cold war were extensively discussed and a democratic demonstration culture established. These forms of public deliberation also applied to internal concerns like the danger of nuclear plants accidents or genetically modi…ed organisms. In contrast, before the "Monday Demonstrations"of the late 1980s that initiated the collapse of the GDR comparable debates of internal and external concerns of society existed only in the scattered and merely existent underground but not in the public sphere.
A perspective that is at …rst sight at odds with the above line of argumentation can be found in a recent and rather macroeconomic strand of literature that is concerned with …nancial risk taking and the development of respective attitudes. It comes up with another reasoning regarding the nexus of personal or collective experience and risk attitude. For example, it suggests that individuals who had an experience of a large macroeconomic shock like the Great Depression show a long-lasting e¤ect on their attitudes towards risk due to this experience ("depression babies"). An overview of this literature is given in Malmendier and Nagel (2009) . According to this literature, it is, in particular, personal …nancial risk experience that shapes one's preferences towards risk. Given that planned economies, in general, failed to attenuate macroeconomic shocks and showed similar business cycle patterns as market economies (Hillinger 1992) , we would expect no substantial di¤erence in risk attitude. However, we should keep in mind that macroeconomic shocks were experienced quite di¤erently in the two systems. The GDR's collectivist social planner's state, for example, virtually guaranteed full employment, making it unnecessary for citizens to insure against unemployment. In this context, insurance through free capital market instruments, represented by a vast diversity of stock market vehicles, can be seen as an experience good or service in the sense of Nelson (1970) . Interpreting (…nancial) risk aversion in this way, we would also expect former GDR citizens to be characterized by a relatively lower level of risk aversion compared to West German individuals whose attitude evolved over decades of repeated (positive) experience with capital market instruments in insuring against macroeconomic shocks. This line of reasoning is restricted to the …nancial aspect of risk aversion. It does not apply to a more general notion of risk attitude.
Using the "all reset button" experiment of German reuni…cation our study can shed some light on whether the default level of (the general notion of) risk attitude actually is the more risk loving or the less risk loving attitude compared to the one prevalent in an established market economy. This question is regardless of the reuni…cation process interesting in itself as we can make the point for either default level. Following the literature cited above, we can interpret risk aversion as the outcome of a learning process. Accordingly, the default level is the relatively more risk loving one. An intuitive example is a toddler playing on the edge of a cli¤. However, from anthropology we know of relics from cavemen times like the state of being paralyzed with shock in the case of an unexpected threat that speak in favor of a relatively more risk averse default level. 3 
Political system, fairness and value systems
As argued in Fehr and Rockenbach (2003) , fairness is, in fact, prior to trust in that it represents the deeper of the two notions, implying that social trust might be seen as the outcome of a (repeated) experience of fairness and cooperativeness. It questions the dominant role and universality of self-interest and the implication that welfare enhancing cooperation is doomed to fail unless well de…ned small groups interact inde…nitely (Gächter et al. 2010 ). See also Fehr and Schmidt (2006) for a recent survey of the related theoretical literature. Yet there are only a few studies that empirically study fairness at the societal level (see, e.g., Zak and Fakhar 2005) . To our knowledge, none of them analyzes the notion of fairness in the context of the reuni…cation of Germany.
A political system, in particular, in its polar form of a collectivist (GDR) or individualist (FRG) society, shapes through, among others, markets and economic institutions the cultural and socio-economic background of a society (Greif 1994 , Bowles 1998 ). Fairness as a dominant behavioral force is found to be determined by this type of background 
Theoretical model
The following model draws on Tabellini (2008b) , and extends it in its static version (section 3.1) and, in particular, in its dynamic version (section 3.2) to the case of two societies that evolved for some generations separately and get (re-)uni…ed (section 3.3).
Basic comparative static model: Exogenous values
The basic model represents a one-shot matching game, where individuals are randomly matched with one another. Each individual is located at distance y with probability g (y) > 0, where distance not necessarily refers to geography, but also to social or economic dimensions such as religion, ethnicity, and class. 4 After having been matched, individuals observe their distance and play a prisoner's dilemma game including material payo¤s ( Figure 1) . Besides these material payo¤s, each individual receives a non-economic psychological bene…t d > max (l; w) whenever playing C, irrespective of the strategy played by the opponent. In other words, the non-material payo¤s represent a value of cooperating per se. We can interpret them as "warm glow" (Andreoni 1990 ). Bene…t drawn from this e¤ect decays with distance at exponential rate > 0. Strategy C, therefore, generates a non-economic bene…t that amounts to de y . Thus, parameter can be interpreted as the rate at which non-economic bene…ts decay with distance y, relative to the economic payo¤s. This feature of the model captures the idea that norms of good conduct apply particularly strong within a circle of socially connected individuals (e.g., relatives and nuclear circle of friends), and less so with less familiar individuals (strangers).
There are two players k = 0; 1. Both enjoy the same bene…t d of cooperating, but di¤er in the rate at which the bene…t decays with distance, 1 and 0 , with 0 > 1 .
Tabellini (2008b) refers to the two types as trustworthy (if k = 1) and not-trustworthy (if k = 0), because for any positive distance a trustworthy player values cooperation more than a not-trustworthy player. Individuals observe distance y, but not trustworthiness of the other party. The fraction of trustworthy (k = 1) types in the population is the same at any point in a uniformly distributed continuum of one-period lived individuals.
This fraction n is for the moment assumed to be a …xed parameter n with 1 > n > 0.
It is endogenized in the dynamic version of the model. In the context of the division of Germany, we can inversely interpret 1 n as the number of players who strictly adhere, irrespective of private spheres and a potential warm glow, to the guidelines of the system and play NC. In the GDR system this type of behavior corresponds to toeing the party line of the socialist unity party.
Let (y) denote the probability that the opponent player will choose C, such that the expected payo¤ from playing NC rather than C is (y) w plus, in terms of an avoided loss, [1 (y)] l. Therefore, we can express a player's "sucker's payo¤"as
Given that l w, function T ( (y)) is non-increasing in (y), the probability that the opponent will play C, and strictly decreasing in (y) if l > w. Intuitively, if l > w, the loss of being cheated is greater than the bene…t of cheating, implying that the temptation to cheat is greater if the opponent is also more likely to cheat (i.e., T ( ) is strictly decreasing in ). This feature represents an inherent strategic complementarity of the game. Every player is weighing this temptation up against the non-economic bene…t of cooperation, de k y , which depends on a player's type. Therefore, indi¤erence between playing C or NC is given for
Using (1), taking logs of (2), considering ln l e y k (l w) = ln l + e y k (w l) , we can solve for e y k to obtain e y k = ln d ln (w l) e y k + l = k :
Holding constant, e y k de…nes a threshold, inasmuch individual k prefers to play C in a match with someone at distance y < e y k , while k prefers to play NC if y > e y k . If l > w, the right-hand side of (3) is increasing in (y). There are multiple equilibria. We follow Tabellini (2008b) by concentrating only on the Pareto superior equilibrium that sustains maximal cooperation. Next, consider a not-trustworthy player, k = 0, and suppose that the opponent is always expected to cooperate, i.e., (y) = 1. In this case (3) reduces to
Player k = 0 …nds it optimal to cooperate up to distance y Y 0 and to play NC if y > Y 0 . Up to distance y Y 0 a trustworthy player also plays C, because a higher non-economic bene…t from cooperation is given. For y > Y 0 , however, the good player realizes that all the not-trustworthy players will play NC. The trustworthy player's most optimistic expectation is that only trustworthy type opponents cooperate. Being matched with such an opponent happens with probability n. Inserting (y) = n in the right-hand side of (3), we obtain
If e y 1 > Y 0 , a trustworthy player …nds it optimal to cooperate up to e y 1 , given that all other trustworthy players are expected to also cooperate; beyond this threshold this type of player prefers to play NC. If instead e y 1 Y 0 , then (given the expectation that everyone cooperates up to Y 0 ), such a player also prefers to play C up to Y 0 , but not beyond.
Thus, in equilibrium, the upper threshold of cooperation for a trustworthy player is
Note that Y 1 Y 0 , with strict inequality if n is su¢ ciently large, or if the two types are su¢ ciently di¤erent from each other. To see this, consider that Y 1 increases with e y 1 irrespective of Y 0 according to (6) .
Proof. See Appendix A.
So far, we have derived a lower (Y 0 ) and an upper (Y 1 ) threshold for cooperativeness,
de…ne the scope of cooperation in nearby or more distant matches. The model is driven by an information externality, as good players bear the risk of cooperating against an unreliable opponent due to individuals being unable to observe their opponent type. The increasing e¤ect of n on Y 1 re ‡ects the strategic complementarity in the prisoner's dilemma game. Given l > w, individuals are more willing to cooperate the higher is the probability that their partner will also cooperate. With regard to a communist system, this strategic complementarity can be interpreted in the following way: If a system succeeds in raising the number of individuals 1 n who are true to its principles, it simultaneously fosters the collectivistic attitude of people who are already blindly loyal to the system.
In the context of Germany's division and reuni…cation, a decreasing cooperativeness with increasing 1 n is a central testable implication: The share of not-trustworthy individuals in a society 1 n can be exogenously increased by a repressive political regime as was the case in the GDR due to every day life in…ltrating activities of Stasi (secret state's police) collaborators and the hiring and networking of civilian informants. Consider an in…nite economy, where agents live two periods. In the …rst period, they get educated by their parents. After completion of education, agents become themselves players in the game described above. In the second period, each individual is the parent of a single kid and the parent's only activity is to educate the respective o¤spring. Parental education increases the probability that the kid becomes trustworthy ( k = 1 ), but is costly for the parent. Educational e¤ort f is chosen by each parent before observing a kid's type of value system. The probability of having a trustworthy kid does not depend on the parent's type. The impact of "nature and nurture" is denoted by and f , respectively. Given e¤ort f 0, the kid turns out to be trustworthy ( k = 1 ) with
Dynamic model: Endogenous values
Letting V pk t denote the parent's p evaluation of the respective kid's overall expected utility in the equilibrium of the matching game at period t for k; p = 0; 1, we can write for a matched pair with distance z:
where U k t = U k ; n t denotes the expected equilibrium material payo¤s of a kid. Together with the parent's evaluation of the kid's expected non-economic bene…t of cooperating in matches of distance smaller than Y k t it makes V pk t . If p 6 = k , p and k have di¤erent values, and V pk t di¤ers from the kid's own evaluation. Tabellini The fraction of trustworthy players in each period, n t , evolves endogenously over time according to the following fundamental law of motion
where f t now exclusively denotes e¤ort by a good parent. If parents exert no e¤ort, the average fraction of trustworthy kids in the population equals . In period t, the fraction of trustworthy parents n t 1 exerts educational e¤ort f t , which in turn increases the fraction of trustworthy kids in the population by n t 1 f t on average. The parents' optimal choice of educational e¤ort implies f t > 0. Recalling + f t is denoting a probability, it
follows that 1 f t . Furthermore, f t can be shown to be a known functionf t = F (Y 1 t ) that is strictly increasing in Y 1 t . This implies a second strategic complementarity. If parents expect others to put more e¤ort into education, they anticipate that the fraction of trustworthy players will increase. They realize that this will expand the scope of cooperation Y 1 t and increase educational e¤ort. This central feature of the model produces a certain inertia: A high starting level of trustworthiness in a society (n 0 ) can be sustained just as well as a low starting level for several generations. The educational game behind is supermodular (Tabellini 2008b, pp. 921-922) . To derive the equilibrium and steady state, the equilibrium vector (Y 1 t ; n t ) is de…ned to solve
The …rst of these two equations de…nes the maximum distance Y 1 t that sustains cooperation by trustworthy players as a function of the fraction of other trustworthy players.
It is strictly increasing and convex in n t if l > w. The second equation de…nes the law of motion of the fraction of trustworthy players. As Y 1 t increases, trustworthy parents are induced to put more e¤ort into changing their kid's values due to the second strategic complementarity in the model. Hence, function n t = N (Y 1 t ; n t 1 ) is also increasing in Y 1 t . Thus, equilibrium (Y 1 t ; n t ) is a function of n t 1 . Setting n t = n t 1 = n s , a steady state is given by
We can derive the following central testable implications that we will elaborate in more detail in the context of Germany's reuni…cation in the next subsection:
Individuals are more willing to cooperate the higher is the probability that their partner will also cooperate. The scope of cooperation Y 1 t is increasing in n t and decreasing in (1 n t ), that is, in the share of trustworthy and not-trustworthy individuals, respectively. This implies l > w, i.e., there is strategic complementarity.
If the …rst implication is found to hold, the equilibrium asymptotically reaches a steady state (Y 1 t ; n t ).
If the …rst two implications are found to hold, then both Y 1 t and n t are timevarying, and during the adjustment to the steady state move in the same direction.
The adjustment is not abrupt. There is inertia in n. It takes > 1 generation until a new steady state is reached (second strategic complementarity).
Trust, scope of cooperation and German Reuni…cation
Consider two societies, East (E) and West (W ), that developed a scope of cooperation over several decades independently of each other according to the above outlined model,
The respective steady states are depicted as the two points of intersection in Figure 2 . Obviously and intuitively, n t:
Clearly, n E t 1 , i.e., the share of trustworthy individuals in the former GDR has a sustained impact on the share of trustworthy individuals even several generations after reuni…cation. However, this impact has a decaying weight due to f < 1. In the period of reuni…cation, the East German society moves out of its original steady state due to the exogenous decrease in the overall fraction of not-trustworthy fellow citizens. This induces a second round e¤ect as East German parents now expect other East German parents to put more e¤ort into educating a trustworthy o¤spring. They anticipate that due to this e¤ect the fraction of trustworthy players will further increase and they realize that this will expand the scope of cooperation Y 1E t . By increasing, both n E and Y 1E move in the same direction towards the West German steady state levels "What is your opinion on the following three statements?", the items being: (A) "On the whole one can trust people", (B) "Nowadays one can't rely on anyone", and (C) "If one is dealing with strangers, it is better to be careful before one can trust them." Responses are given on a Likert-type ordinal 4-point scale, ranging from 1 "totally agree" to 4 "totally disagree". To ease interpretation, responses from the three items are each collapsed into a binary indicator which takes on value one if the respondent is a trusting one, i.e. if he or she totally agrees with the …rst statement, or in the case of (B) and (C) totally disagrees with either of these two other statements. This might seem a loss of information, but additional ordered probit estimations do not yield substantially di¤erent results. 5 There are two further points to note with regard to these survey questions. First, item (B) is not a static statement. It has some backward looking dimension as it requires respondents to compare the situation today with the past. Secondly, item (C) asks about an assessment of the trustworthiness of strangers. It is noteworthy that this group of strangers usually refers not only to individuals who are not socially connected to the respondent but also comprises foreign nationals.
Perceived fairness in the society is surveyed by "Do you believe that most people ..." (A) "would exploit you if they had the opportunity" or (B) "would attempt to be fair towards you?". Our -again binary-fairness variable equals one if the respondent approves the latter statement.
Similarly, the binary "people are cooperative"indicator is generated from the responses to "Would you say that for most of the time, people ..." given by (A) "attempt to be helpful?" or (B) "only act in their own interests?". Approving the …rst statement induces value one in our variable.
Individuals' risk attitudes were …rst measured in 2004, with a general risk attitude item as well as context-speci…c risk attitudes, such as risk-taking in …nancial matters, in sports, or in health, and another risk measure derived from a hypothetical lottery scenario. To be able to examine the development over time, we however use the general risk attitude scale since it is only this indicator that is re-measured in 2008. 6 The questions in both waves of the survey read "Are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks or do you try to avoid taking risks? ;" the scale of responses runs from 0 "risk averse" to 10 "fully prepared to take risks." We employ least squares estimation for this variable as, again, results from ordered probit estimations are not substantially di¤erent from the ones we present below (see footnote 5).
In addition, we extend our analysis by looking at individuals'attitudes towards income redistribution. This exercise repeats and adds to the one by Rainer and Siedler (2008) . While they control for Easterners, their focus is on the impact of individuals' perceptions of occupational upward mobility on preferences for redistribution. We add to their approach relaxing their age limit and thus employing a larger sample, as well as including a larger set of controls out of which the dummy on whether an East German respondent moved to West Germany after reuni…cation deserves our interest. Since it is plausible to assume that moving is caused by the better economic conditions in the Western federal states, 7 this coe¢ cient captures the learning process the respondent is subject to: Adjusting his or her budget constraint by increasing income should thus alter the perception of the 'fairness'of the taxation scheme. To assess the attitude of SOEP respondents towards progressive taxation, the following questions were asked: (A) "Is the amount of taxes paid by an unskilled worker in Germany too much compared to other groups, too little, or exactly appropriate?"and (B) "And what do you think about the taxes paid by a manager on the board of directors of a large company? Does he/she pay too much, too little, or an exactly appropriate amount of taxes compared to other groups?".
Again, we recoded (A) and (B) into an ordered gradient. Note that these items were surveyed only once in 2005, so that we can get a cross-sectional picture only. However, these cross-sectional estimates are intended to gleam a greater picture by complementing the overall results from our longitudinal analyses.
Our baseline speci…cations are linear probability models accounting for random e¤ects (RE-LPM) of the following form
where y = (trust j fairness j cooperativeness j risk), and (6), we estimate a statistically signi…cant negative coe¢ cient for individuals who experienced the GDR system (East German), suggesting a still existent relatively lower level of trust prevalent among this group of individuals. In all even speci…cations (2), (4), and (6), we also consider a potential e¤ect from moving to West Germany after reuni…cation. We expect these respondents to show a relatively higher level of trust compared to individuals who did not move to the West as it is plausible to assume that either trust fosters migration or migrating forces to trust. Apart from the trust towards strangers, 8 the estimates reported in Table 1 support this hypothesis.
Yet, in terms of size, an East-West gap remains and increases throughout, meaning that the East-West di¤erentials are even larger for those East Germans who did not migrate after reuni…cation.
The central coe¢ cient estimate to assess East-West convergence as described by the model outlined in the preceding section is the interaction term of East German background and the ending year of our analysis 2008 (EGerman*08). As can be seen from estimates of speci…cation (2) to (6) in Table 1 , there is convergence for the item capturing the assessment of the overall trustworthiness of other people (Can trust people) and perceived trustworthiness of strangers (Careful with strangers). In the case of the former, the trust measure increases even if we di¤erence out subjects who moved to the West. All other things being equal, the estimates of speci…cation (2) can be read in the following way: Starting from an East German trust level of 0:065, every year, that is, four times up to 2008, a term of +0:016=4 is added. According to this stylized calculation of a convergence trajectory (cf. Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln 2007), full convergence of this trust item between East and West German individuals will be reached in one decade from now, that is, in 2020. This …nding is clearly in line with theoretical predictions given in Section 3 and, in particular, also with the prediction of a possibly substantial inertia in the passing of trust as a cultural value across generations. It is also this measure among the three analyzed trust items that comes the closest to the general notion of trust underlying the model of Tabellini (2008b) and its application to the case of German reuni…cation outlined in Section 3. Note: ***, **, * denotes statistical signi…cance at 1, 5, 10 percent level, respectively; robust standard errors given in parentheses."Can't rely on anyone" and "Careful with strangers" are binary variables and recoded such that value 1 does not imply distrust, but trust.
Estimated coe¢ cients of speci…cations (5) and (6) imply that, other things being equal, full convergence in perceived trustworthiness of strangers is reached by 2009, that is, 20 years after reuni…cation. Estimates of speci…cations (3) and (4) In sum, regression results of our analysis of di¤erent trust items con…rm that individuals who experienced the GDR system still show a relatively higher level of social distrust and scepticism. We also …nd that it is important to account for East-West migration. Although pointing in the same direction, our estimates suggest to carefully distinguish between di¤erent dimensions of perceived trustworthiness: The persistence of the East-West trust di¤erential is the most pronounced for the intertemporal blackand-white measure of trust, showing virtually no convergence. It is followed by the overall trustworthiness of other people that will possibly converge some thirty years or one generation after reuni…cation. Finally, convergence in the perceived trustworthiness of strangers is estimated to be reached in recent years, that is, less than one generation after reuni…cation. Regarding the con…rmation of theoretical predictions, our estimates employing the most general measure of trust as dependent variable con…rm all testable implications of the model outlined in Section 3. Table 2 reports RE-LPM estimates employing as dependents our measures of perceived fairness and cooperativeness as well as of individual risk attitude. As can be seen immediately from the …rst line of coe¢ cient estimates in Table 2 , East German individuals report lower levels of perceived fairness and cooperativeness, but are relatively more inclined to take risks. Regarding relative size of coe¢ cients, this gap sustains even if we control for moves to the West, which seem to play a statistically signi…cant role only in the case of cooperativeness. Accordingly, movers assess cooperativeness higher than individuals who stayed in East Germany after the fall of the wall, though still lower than West Germans. 32, 196 Note: ***, **, * denotes statistical signi…cance at 1, 5, 10 percent level, respectively; robust standard errors given in parentheses. "Fairness" and "Cooperativeness" are binary variables representing whether the respondent perceives others to act fair or to be helpful.
Fairness, cooperativeness, risk attitude
Another striking result is that we …nd no signi…cant East-West convergence of either perceived fairness or cooperativeness between 2003 and 2008, while risk attitudes fully converged before the end of the second decade after reuni…cation. The latter …nding is straightforwardly explained by the learning process described in Section 2.2. In fact, it is suggestive for a relatively short period of learning and adjustment to a more risk averse attitude taking the time of about 1.5 to 2-times the length of an average business cycle. But how can the …nding of no convergence in fairness and cooperativeness be reconciled with our theoretical model in Section 3? The answer is a low elasticity with which the upper bound of the scope of cooperation (Y 1 ) reacts to an increase of trust, i.e. to an increase in the number of trustworthy individuals in the society. Figure 4 makes the point. As in Figure 2 However, although there is a profound convergence along the ordinate, the e¤ect on cooperativeness is small given a low elasticity with which Y 1 reacts to an increase in n.
Technically, this elasticity is low when l and w are close in value (see Appendix A), that is, when the loss from being cheated in the prisoner's dilemma game is nearly the same (or only slightly larger than) the bene…t of cheating. Intuitively, this circumstance makes it hard for individuals to discriminate between a matched partner playing fair and an unfair partner. As a result, there is no unique steady state in the level of cooperativeness in reuni…ed Germany, i.e., Figure 4 . This explains both of our …ndings: persistence in the East-West fairness and cooperativeness gap and a simultaneous convergence in trust.
Age e¤ects, cohort e¤ects, and regional variation
To analyze in more detail whether the duration of living in the repressive East German system has left an imprint on our social and risk attitude measures for easterners, we run additional regressions including terms that interact the East German background (i) with age and (ii) with cohort dummies. Results for these estimates are shown in Table 3 and Table 4 . Notes: ***, **, * denotes statistical signi…cance at 1, 5, 10 percent level, respectively; robust standard errors given in parentheses; Trust 1: "Can trust people", Trust 2: "Can't rely on anyone", Trust 3: "Careful with strangers"; the latter two variables are recoded such that value 1 does not imply distrust, but trust; "Fairness" and "Cooperativeness" are binary variables representing whether the respondent perceives others to act fair or to be helpful.
Our …nding of a signi…cant positive (and substantial in terms of size) interaction term for age and cohort dummy, indicating that respondents spent at least part of their adolescence behind the Iron Curtain, in the case of risk attraction is plausible. First, it is noteworthy that overall we …nd younger individuals to be slightly more risk loving than older ones (slope of age without interaction). Secondly, however, in the case of easterners risk willingness profoundly increases with age, i.e. with time spent in the, at least, economically less risky and widely without public deliberation of societal risk environment of the GDR (cf. the estimated coe¢ cient of EGerman*age term in Table   3 ). This insight clearly reinforces our explanation of a learning process. Similarly, with regard to cohort e¤ects (Table 4) , we …nd statistically signi…cant and sizable risk love mark-ups for the top aged cohorts aged 65 years. This cohort also comprises individuals that might have a free market experience from the time before division thwarting the need to learn a risk averse attitude. However, it should be kept in mind that this group of people is of negligible size as respondents who had experienced, for example, the "golden twenties"as young adults would be in their late 90s in 2008. The corresponding signi…cant estimates for our measure of perceived cooperativeness con…rm that freeing a society's captive minds is particularly hard for adults who spent their formative years under communism. They suggest that only when the memory of totalitarian rule will wash out, communism's shadow will …nally be lifted and the scope of cooperation will converge. In terms of our theoretical model, a long-term equilibrium lying right from Y 1
in Figure 4 will be reached.
Some regional variation at the federal state level in the East-West convergence of social and risk attitude measures is reported in Table 5 . This is of interest since there has been disparity in di¤erent spheres of life in the GDR, despite the system's claim of an equal standard of living in the whole country. 9 Clearly, we do not and cannot argue that the di¤erences in conditions as given at around reuni…cation would still persist in 2003/4 as transfer payments from West to East have been enormous (cf. Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln 2007), but it might still be possible that the learning process as outlined in our model above will vary across the federal states. 10 Our results imply that it is only in the region of Brandenburg where measures of social trust converged to the level of westerners. For individuals from Mecklenburg-West Pomerania, Saxony-Anhalt, and, in particular, from Saxony we even …nd a signi…cant diverging tendency. However, we should interpret this result rather cautiously as there might be a substantial within-state heterogeneity of regional characteristics like urbanity as is the case for Saxony. Notes: ***, **, * denotes statistical signi…cance at 1, 5, 10 percent level, respectively; robust standard errors given in parentheses; Trust 1: "Can trust people", Trust 2: "Can't rely on anyone", Trust 3: "Careful with strangers"; the latter two are recoded such that value 1 does not imply distrust, but trust. "Fairness" and "Cooperativeness" are binary variables representing whether the respondent perceives others to act fair or to be helpful. 32, 196 Notes: ***, **, * denotes statistical signi…cance at 1, 5, 10 percent level, respectively; robust standard errors given in parentheses; EB: East Berlin, MVP: Mecklenburg-West Pomerania, BB: Brandenburg, SX(A): Saxony(-Anhalt); Trust 1: "Can trust people", Trust 2: "Can't rely on anyone", Trust 3: "Careful with strangers"; the latter two are recoded such that value 1 does not imply distrust, but trust. "Fairness" and "Cooperativeness" are binary variables representing whether the respondent perceives others to act fair or to be helpful.
Redistribution preferences and personality traits: 2005 cross-section
The results reported by Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007) and Rainer and Siedler (2008) clearly indicate that East Germans are relatively more in favor of state intervention in the form of income redistribution than their Western counterparts. We adapt the approach of Rainer and Siedler (2008) and add to it addressing potential heterogeneity among East Germans, i.e. we di¤erentiate between Easterners who stayed in the former GDR and those who moved west after the fall of the iron curtain. (2008) inasmuch as our evidence also points to pro-working class redistribution preferences among East Germans. We however additionally …nd a di¤erence between movers and individuals that did not move westwards, inasmuch as the latter are not in favor of such redistribution policies. Intuitively, this …nding is straightforward as individuals who move quite likely do so because of promising economic expectations and possibly own prospects of working one's way up. Notes: Ordered Probit estimation, marginal e¤ects; ***, **, * denotes statistical signi…cance at 1, 5, 10 percent level, respectively; robust standard errors given in parentheses.
We provide another complementing part of the overall picture in line with the …ndings of Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007) who show that East Germans are more likely to believe that social conditions determine individual possibilities in life, but not the individual his-or herself. We add to this employing a small set certain personality traits that have an impact on socio-economic behavior and analyze whether these traits di¤er between East and West Germans. In particular, we employ SOEP information on individuals' external locus of control (Rotter 1966 Reciprocity is a further measure on individual's personality that is important in our context. It means that ". . . in response to friendly actions, people are frequently much nicer and much more cooperative than predicted by the self-interest model. Conversely, in response to hostile actions they are frequently much more nasty and even brutal" The results of these additional exercises however are not as convincing as prior expectations might have induced. According to the …ndings provided in Table 7 , East and
West do not di¤er in their propensity to respond to other's actions, irrespective of those being positive or negative. In contrast, our estimates imply that East Germans have a higher external locus of control. That is, compared to their West German counterparts, East Germans, and particularly those who did not move west, are more likely believing that external forces shape the circumstances they live in. Again, we believe that this results …ts well to our baseline argument that the former East German Communist system has left a long-lasting imprint on their citizens. Moreover, there is no hint towards convergence of this gap. Given that the East German economic conditions are still worse than the West German ones, one might argue and hope that these di¤erentials will level o¤ once the economic framework will allow East Germans to be less dependent on state provided transfers. 34 
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Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1. To show that @Y 1 @n > 0, and Y 1 increases in n until Y 1 Y 0 holds, is equivalent to show that @ e y 1 @n > 0. Re-write equation (5) in the text e y 1 = fln d ln [ n + l]g 1 ;
where
= w l < 0 for l > w; and di¤erentiate with respect to n to obtain @ e y 1 @n = 
